Plaintiff sued the landlord and tenant for injuries that his son sustained when he was bitten by the tenant’s dog.In order to recover against a landlord for injuries caused by a tenant’s dog on a theory of strict liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord: (1) had notice that a dog was being harbored on the premises; (2) knew or should have known that the dog had vicious propensities and (3) had sufficient control of the premises to allow the landlord to remove or confine the dog.

Knowledge of a dog’s vicious propensities may be shown by evidence of a landlord’s awareness that the dog would “growl, snap or bare its teeth”.The landlord was aware that a dog was kept on the premises by her tenant and that she could have required him to remove or confine that dog. However, she testified at a pretrial deposition that she had no knowledge of any vicious propensities of the tenant’s dog.

Since plaintiff submitted no proof to the contrary, there was no evidence from which to infer that the dog exhibited vicious propensities when the landlord was on the property nor was there any evidence that anyone communicated any complaints about the dog to the landlord. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed the complaint against the landlord because she established as a matter of law that she neither knew nor should have known of the dog’s alleged vicious propensities.

Plaintiff’s mere speculation that the landlord might have had knowledge of a prior incident involving the dog is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the landlord’s motion to dismiss.