In Players Place II Condominium Association, Inc. v. K.P, the New Jersey Supreme Court on March 13, 2024 reviewed whether the trial court properly dismissed the disability discrimination claims brought by condominium unit owners after the condominium association declined their request to have an emotional support animal (ESA) based on the animal’s weight. The Court also addressed how requests of this type should be evaluated under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD). 
Plaintiff Players Place II Condominium Association limits pets “to the small domestic variety weighing thirty (30) pounds or less at maturity.” Defendant K.P. agreed to be bound by the policy when he purchased a unit. His spouse, defendant B.F., has been diagnosed with several mental health conditions, and K.P. notified the Association that he and B.F. were “considering adopting an emotional support dog” that would “[m]ost likely . . . be over the 30lb pet limit.” Before the Association responded, B.F. adopted a 63-pound dog named Luna to live with her as an ESA. After some further exchanges, counsel for the Association wrote that, “should a dog weighing more than 30lbs . . . even enter the Association, the Association will immediately commence an action at law.” K.P. responded that assistance animals are not considered pets and that, if the Association denied his claim, his “next step [would] be to file a complaint . . . for disability discrimination.” The Association filed a complaint asserting K.P. had violated the Association’s rules because he had a dog that weighed more than 30 pounds and had failed to register the animal. K.P.’s answer included a counterclaim against the Association for allegedly violating anti-discrimination laws.
The Supreme Court held that requests for reasonable accommodations should be assessed under the following framework: Individuals who seek an accommodation must show that they have a disability under the LAD and demonstrate that the requested accommodation may be necessary to afford them an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Housing providers then have the burden to prove the requested accommodation is unreasonable. During that process, both sides should engage in a good-faith, interactive dialogue. If the parties cannot resolve the request, courts may be called on to balance the need for, and benefits of, the requested accommodation against the cost and administrative burdens it presents. Here, the claims should not have been dismissed.
The LAD prohibits discrimination in housing on account of a person’s disability,, including “any mental, psychological, or developmental disability,”. It defines “disability” more broadly than federal law, which requires that a disability “substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). The LAD includes no such requirement.
After reviewing relevant case law and guidance by state and federal agencies, the Court explains that a resident of a condominium complex is entitled to request an accommodation to a pet policy in order to keep an emotional support animal. The individual must first demonstrate they have a disability under the LAD. In addition, they must show that the requested accommodation may be necessary to afford them an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” The housing provider then has the burden to prove the requested accommodation is unreasonable. As part of that process, the parties should engage in a good-faith, interactive dialogue to exchange information, consider alternative options, and attempt to resolve or narrow any issues. If that collaborative effort fails and litigation follows, courts will inevitably need to balance the need for, and benefits of, the requested accommodation against the costs and administrative burdens it presents to determine whether the accommodation is reasonable. Here, there is no longer any dispute that B.F. is disabled within the meaning of the LAD. Whereas the trial court focused on the first of two ways to establish a mental, psychological, or developmental disability. — a disability “which prevents the typical exercise of any bodily or mental functions” — the Appellate Division properly looked to the statute’s second ground — a disability that “is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.” And the record amply supports the Appellate Division’s conclusion that B.F. satisfied the second ground. In addition to establishing their disability, residents have the initial burden to demonstrate the accommodation they seek is necessary. The question is whether the accommodation will alleviate at least one symptom of the disability, not whether the accommodation will cure or eliminate the disability. Here as well, trial testimony provided a record for the chancery court. The LAD does not require that an ESA be prescribed by a mental health professional or that B.F. establish a specific need for a dog that exceeded the weight limit. When possible, it is preferable to engage in a collaborative conversation in advance of acquiring an ESA. The burden then shifts to the housing provider to prove the requested accommodation was unreasonable — a fact-specific weighing of the relevant costs and benefits. The proper inquiry considers whether allowing an ESA would fundamentally alter the housing provider’s operations or impose an undue financial or administrative burden. Whether the animal has been trained is not a relevant consideration. Before a housing provider denies a request on reasonableness grounds, the parties should engage in good-faith, interactive discussions to evaluate the accommodation and explore possible alternatives.
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